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In 1996 Volkswagen (VW) opened a new branch in the Brazilian city Resende; it was called “the 
factory of the future”. It employs 4 500 people, and every day two shifts produce 240 trucks and 
buses. What makes Volkswagen Caminhões e Ônibus special is that VW itself does next to nothing 
in Resende. The corporation owns the buildings, provides the equipment and checks the quality of 
the final output. But the actual work of construction or assembling of subcontracted parts is being 
done by laborers hired by six contractors who are combined in a so-called Modular Consortium. 
This kind of putting-out system is becoming more and more common. The clothing industry 
has been resorting to it already for decades. Nike, for instance, employs about 2 500 people in the 
United States, who mainly do marketing and logistics. The “real” footwear manufacturing is being 
performed by a factorised workforce of 75 000 spread over various Asian countries; they, however, 
are mainly not employed by Nike but by local (sub)contractors.  
Even huge capital goods like airplanes are increasingly produced through subcontracting. 
Occasioned by the 737 Max disasters, researchers and journalists have pointed out that, for some 
twenty years already, Boeing has outsourced much of its software development to Indian IT 
specialists with little knowledge of aeronautics, working for nine or ten dollars per hour. The 
airplane’s design had been contracted out to a firm in Moscow, and it took eighteen reminders to 
convince them that the smoke detectors should be connected to the electrical system … (Robison, 
2019).  
In these, and in many other, cases, the traditional manufacturers are no longer at centre stage. 
What we see is a business modality that in essence resembles the one in old cottage industries, 
where an entrepreneur (called a commissionair) brought yarn to the doorsteps of poor weavers. 
The weavers’ households processed the yarn into textile, which was then picked up again by the 
entrepreneur or his agent, who settled payment with the weaver’s head of household on a piece-
rate. Such an entrepreneur comes close to what Marx called a merchant capitalist – an entrepreneur 
whose main business it is to buy cheap and sell dear. What we have observed in recent years is in 
fact the return of merchant capital. 
This reported reverting to a prior mode of capitalism is quite remarkable. Merchant capital is 
commonly understood to have been the precursor of industrial capital. At first, traders acted as mere 
intermediaries, collecting commodities from producers and distributing them to consumers. 
Subsequently, they increased their hold on the production process by advancing part payment for 
commodities to be fairly and duly delivered; ultimately, they fully controlled the whole production 
process and became “productive capital” (Marx). Many capitalists appear to have gone back to the 
former practice. They are usually able to do so while tightening rather than weakening their control 
over the chain of production, which has grown much longer than used to be the case in the past. 
Backed up by the latest communication technology and state-of-the-art business management 
ploys, these by definition multinational conglomerates succeed in dictating the terms of the global 
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trade.  
The political economist John Smith (2016: 80–83) calls this “arms-length outsourcing”. He 
outlines three reasons why big corporations move on to this strategy: their subcontractors in Africa, 
Asia and Latin America can 1) be forced “into intense competition with one another” which is “a 
more effective way of driving down wages and intensifying labor than doing so in-house through 
appointed managers”; 2) be made responsible for “pollution, poverty wages, and suppression of 
trade unions”; and 3) be burdened with “many of the costs and risks associated with cyclical 
fluctuations in demand” and large disruptions in the world market. The extra profits can then be 
used for “generous dividend payments, share buyback schemes, and speculative investments”. 
This last issue is immediately connected with another trend which has gained much more 
attention: the increasing power of the financial sector (in Marx’s terms: mercantile money and 
interest-bearing capital). The economic power of banks and insurance companies has increased 
enormously, and the short-term interests of shareholders often weigh more heavily than the long-
term interests of enterprises, let alone care and respect for the plight of the workforce. A recent 
study of 698 West European publicly traded companies revealed that only 139 of them – 20 per 
cent – applied more than only financial success indicators (Duurzaam Ondernemen, 2018). 
All these developments articulate important shifts in global capitalism. In the first place, the 
growing influence of merchant and money capital has changed the balance of power within the 
capitalist class. Productive (industrial) capital is often no longer dominant, but has become 
subordinate. The power of trade unions where they are allowed to operate is weakened by this 
development, since they are often much stronger in the productive than in the mercantile and 
financial sectors. In the second place, productive capital has expanded enormously and now 
extends across a much larger part of the world than half a century ago. Important industries, in 
particular labour-intensive ones such as shipbuilding and textiles, have relocated from the North 
Atlantic region to East and South Asia. In the third place, we can observe a “transnationalisation” 
of labour processes. While in the political arena the emphasis is once again on the nation–state, 
mercantile capital is quite successful in crossing territorial borders at will and resists becoming 
subjected to étatist governance. Goods manufactured in one country are increasingly assembled 
from components produced in other countries, which in turn contain subcomponents made in still 
other countries. This process – also known as “slicing up” or “unbundling” supply chains – started 
in the 1960s and has accelerated since the late 1980s. As a consequence, transport (logistics) has 
grown explosively as well. 
Obviously, these trends have major repercussions for the world working class. A growing 
share of the world’s labour force consists of those who depend directly or indirectly on wages. In 
that sense, we see progressing proletarianisation. According to the International Labour 
Organization (ILO, 2020) the percentage of pure and formally registered wage dependents 
(“employees”) rose between 1991 and 2018 from over 41 per cent to over 51 per cent. The actual 
world working class is, of course, considerably more numerous than the number of “employees”. 
To begin with, contributing household members, who are either off-and-on or even full-time 
engaged in the work process without being separately paid for the use of their labour power, should 
be added to this figure. An even more sizable contingent, rarely acknowledged but firmly included 
in the workforce, is an unknown share of own-account workers. Although often referred to as self-
employed, a major segment of the labouring poor classified under this label are casually employed 
and waged workers in disguise. Their imposed self-reliance is a pretext for not classifying them as 
wage-dependent. 
A second major change is that more and more wage-earners are connected across borders, 
often without being aware of it. The ILO’s report, The Changing Nature of Jobs, estimated that: 
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In 40 countries representing 85 per cent of world gross domestic product and covering approximately 
two-thirds of the global labor force, the number of global supply chain-related jobs increased by 157 
million or 53 per cent between 1995 and 2013, resulting in a total of 453 million global supply chain-
related jobs in 2013 (ILO, 2015: 118–119).  
 
This equals one quarter of employees. While transnationalisation has greatly boosted 
industrialisation in the Global South, the jobs created are largely unskilled and increasingly – 
especially in the Global South – performed by women. The International Trade Union 
Confederation (ITUC) notes: 
 
Eighty per cent of world trade and 60% of global production is now captured by the supply chains 
of multinational companies. The majority of supply chain workers are trapped in insecure and often 
unsafe jobs with poverty wages and long hours. Informal work, forced overtime and slavery are also 
found in the mix. A recent ITUC report shows that 50 of the world’s largest companies directly 
employ just 6% of the workers in their supply chains – the remaining 94% are part of the hidden 
workforce of global production (ITUC, Undated). 
 
The third factor intensifying economic connectivity between workers from different parts of 
the world is migration. While the share of the total flow of cross-border migrants in the world 
population had been fairly consistent for decades (around 3 per cent), the distance travelled 
increased, while the destination reached widened with South–North migration in particular 
becoming more important than it had been in the past. Over the last decades, its size has spiralled 
from 16 per cent in 1960 to 37 per cent 2000, according to a study by the World Bank (Çağlar, 
Parsons, Schiff and Walmsley, 2011: 15–16). For example, migrants from East Asia and the Pacific, 
who once migrated elsewhere within the region, now constitute sizable communities across the 
world. An increasing number of Africans make their homes in Europe and the United States. 
Finally, the share of women in international migration flows is progressively increasing as well. 
A striking feature of the spatial labour mobility – whether within one country, international 
or intercontinental – is the rapidly swelling lack of employment at the point of departure. Migration 
as a permanent change of residence can no longer be taken for granted. The conventional notion 
of lasting departure from the place of origin and resettlement at the site of destination has given 
way to going off but coming back again after some time or, at the latest, towards the end of working 
life. Ongoing circulation also tends to be restricted to individualised earning capability and does 
not involve other family members. In such instances the household as a unit of cohabitation 
becomes multi-locational with those moving out sending remittances back home to provide 
livelihood income for its non-labouring members. The increasing part of the globalised workforce 
made footloose in cyclical migration often remains adrift, undocumented and unregistered in the 
landscape of their passage. Sans papiers, they are vulnerable in their illegality and easily fall victim to 
exploitation, repression and deportation.  
Growing un- and underemployment – partly the result of growing labour productivity without 
the redistribution of jobs – is the final factor that we should mention. The new technological 
revolution has resulted in the steady displacement worldwide of unskilled to low-skilled labour by 
capital, further tilting the already highly skewed balance between them. According to the ILO, 
between 5 and 6 per cent of the world’s labour force is unemployed. This figure is deceptive. In 
countries where unemployment benefits and other social security arrangements are virtually non-
existent, unemployment rates tend to be remarkably low, because very few can afford not to have 
a job at all. Deprived from all means of production, they get by as casual labour and may drift into 
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begging, prostitution and other forms of mendacity. It is a state of subhuman existence which 
signals the return of social Darwinism. The actual unemployment problem is several times greater 
than the ILO statistics suggest. Gallup, the well-known American management consulting 
company, has shared some interesting observations about this. In the past few years, the company 
has organised global surveys revealing that in 2014 and 2016 32 per cent of residents aged 23 to 65 
across 155 countries had so-called “good jobs” – that is, they worked at least 30 hours per week 
for an employer. Gallup believes that a large share of all other workers – half of the self-employed 
and people who work part time but want full-time work – should be added to the unemployed, 
yielding a total of roughly 33 per cent currently unemployed or underemployed (Gallup, 2017: 18; 
Clifton, 2018). 
How can we bring back the social question to the agenda of the global powers that be? The 
urgent need to do so is of imperative relevance, as argued in a recent publication (Breman, Harris, 
Lee and Van der Linden, 2019). The common denominator of the multi-continental contributions 
made to this volume is that this will not take place under the current regime of neo-liberal 
capitalism. The relative decline of the international trade union movement should be seen in this 
context.1 Global union density is currently somewhere between 6 or 7 per cent and only reaches 
that level by including the disputed presence of the state-directed and controlled Chinese trade 
union organisation in the estimate. There are, of course, important and courageous attempts at 
renewal, such as the Indian New Trade Union Initiative, or WIEGO, a worldwide network of 
working-class women in the informal economy.2 But much more has to be done, especially in and 
from the dominating North. The challenge is huge and awesome. The current regime of predatory 
capitalism does not provide enough gainful work for the dispossessed masses in the globalised 
economy. Because they are redundant to demand, they are considered to be surplus people. With 
muted voices and held invisible in their pauperised habitus, they are not acknowledged as 
stakeholders allowed to take part in the discussion on how to cut up the world’s accumulated 
wealth. The fall-out of the ongoing COVID-19 crisis, hurting the poor segments of the population 
in terms of health and livelihood more than those who are better off, makes the problem caused 
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